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T 
he current financial market turmoil has sparked debates 
across the globe about the supervision and regulation of 
the financial services industry.  As the Basel II capital frame-
work is implemented worldwide, many critics have highlighted 
weaknesses underscored by the crisis.  The most prominent 
criticisms of the framework include its lack of an explicit liquid-
ity risk capital charge, its over-reliance on credit rating agen-
cies, and its pro-cyclical nature.  As top financial leaders are 
calling for more drastic measures to revamp supervisory struc-
tures, the Basel II standard should continue to evolve.  Nonethe-
less, it is useful to review how Asian financial sector regulators 
are implementing the framework because the guiding principles 
behind Basel II, while imperfect, highlight an important step for 
Asian economies to develop more robust banking systems. This 
Asia Focus report examines Basel II implementation in Asian 
economies and discusses key issues and challenges facing Asian 
banks and regulators. 
 
The Road to Basel II 
Adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(“Basel Committee”) in 1988, the Basel Capital Accord, com-
monly referred to as “Basel I,” represented the first prudential 
standard of a risk-based capital framework.  It also marked the 
beginning of the process of international capital standards con-
vergence.  Initially intended for internationally active banks in 
the G-10 countries
i, over time the Basel I regime was widely 
adopted in over 100 jurisdictions across multiple continents and 
regulatory bodies.  Although the framework was successful in 
its overwhelming acceptance, some have criticized its limited 
risk sensitivity.  For example, Basel I assigns all corporate loans 
the same capital charge regardless of underlying credit quality, 
and the framework is focused mainly on credit risk.  As a result, 
the Basel Committee decided in the late 1990s to amend the 
framework.  Following more than five years of deliberations and 
industry consultation, the Basel Committee in June 2004 pub-
lished its Revised Framework on International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, commonly referred 
to as “Basel II.”   
Basel II is a more risk-sensitive framework than Basel I with re-
spect to the minimum levels of capital required for internationally 
active banks.  In the Basel II framework, Pillar 1 prescribes mini-
mum capital levels to support a bank’s credit, market and opera-
tional risks.  Pillar 2 describes the accompanying supervisory 
review of a bank’s internal capital adequacy assessment, which 
should include appropriate techniques for monitoring and manag-
ing risks, and a process for determining overall capital needs in 
relation to those risks.  Pillar 3 outlines market discipline, which 
complements the first two Pillars by encouraging public disclo-
sures that offer market participants the ability to assess key infor-
mation about an institution’s risk profile and its associated level 
of capital.  The focus of this report is on Pillar 1, as the current 
implementation efforts are centered there. 
 
The Basel II framework for Pillar 1 includes different approaches 
for measuring risk under each risk category (i.e., credit, market, 
and operational risks), with the more advanced approaches re-
quiring supervisory approval prior to adoption.  The table below 
provides a summary of the approaches under each category. 
 
Implementing Basel II in Asia 
Most regulators in Asian economies support the broad objectives 
of Basel II and believe that the framework will provide further 
incentives for improvements in risk management, as well as other 
changes that complement their supervisory objectives.   
 
In general, Asian regulators do not mandate or require banks to 
adopt specific approaches.  Asian banks may choose the ap-
proaches that are commensurate with their risk profiles, depend-
ing on their size, complexity, and other considerations.  For ex-
ample, the regulatory authorities in both Singapore and Taiwan 
have made all approaches available and banks are encouraged to 
adopt the approach that will best match their risk profile in each 
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  Risk Category  Approaches (in order of increasing complexity) 
Credit  Standardized Approach  Foundation Internal Ratings 
Based (IRB) Approach  Advanced IRB Approach 
Market  Standardized Measurement 
Approach  Internal Models Approach  --------- 
Operational  Basic Indicator Approach  Standardized Approach  Advanced Measurement     
Approach (AMA) risk category.  At the same time, regulatory authorities have 
encouraged their supervised banks to continually upgrade 
their risk management capabilities.  The table below presents 
the timeline for Basel II implementation across Asian econo-
mies, focusing on the approaches for measuring credit and 
operational risks.
ii  The implementation schedules, which be-
gan as early as January 2007, and the significant number of 
Asian economies adopting Basel II standards, highlight the 
widespread acceptance of the Basel II framework. 
 
Initially, most Asian banks adopted the Standardized Ap-
proach for credit risk. Only a limited number of the larger 
banks in Asia chose to adopt the more complex IRB Ap-
proach.  For operational risk, Asian banks are generally adopt-
ing the more basic approaches – the Basic Indicator and Stan-
dardized Approaches.  At this time, most of the Asian econo-
mies have not begun adopting the most sophisticated AMA 
methodology for operational risk.  
 
In terms of implementation phases, some economies have 
closely followed the timeline suggested in the Basel II stan-
dard: January 1, 2007, for the more basic approaches, and 
January 1, 2008, for the most advanced approaches.  Exam-
ples include Hong Kong (except AMA for operational risk), 
Singapore, and Taiwan.  Other countries have decided to take 
a more gradual approach to adopting the standard.  For exam-
ple, the regulators in the Philippines have adopted only the 
most basic approaches at this time, but have expressed their 
intent to move toward adopting the Foundation or Advanced 
IRB approaches in 2010.  India, which has taken a similar 
position, has adopted the most basic approaches, and regula-
tors there have said that migration to the more advanced ap-
proaches will take place after adequate skill sets have been 
acquired by both the banks and supervisors.  In China, the 
regulatory authority is expecting “large complex banks with 
[an] overseas presence
iii” to have risk management infrastruc-
ture in place by 2010, while all other banks are permitted to 
continue with Basel I.  Regulators in China have stated that 
banks should develop a stronger risk management infrastruc-
ture before being required to implement the Basel II standard. 
 
Observations, Issues and Challenges 
Implementation of the more basic approaches  
At least at the outset, most Asian banks are adopting the Stan-
dardized Approach for credit risk.  Although this is the most 
basic approach, it comes with certain implementation chal-
 
  Basel II Implementation Schedule in Asian Economies 
  
CREDIT RISK                                                
APPROACHES 
OPERATIONAL RISK                                  
APPROACHES 
Economy 
Standardized       
Approach  
Foundation-
Internal   Ratings 
Based          
Advanced-
Internal  Ratings 
Based  
Basic          
Indicator    
Approach  
Standardized      
Approach  
Advanced       
Measurement      
Approach 
China   n.a.  Expected 2010   n.a.  n.a.  Expected 2010  n.a. 
Hong Kong  1/1/2007  1/1/2008  1/1/2007  n.a. 
India  3/31/2007  n.a.   4/1/2007    n.a.  
Japan  4/1/2007  4/1/2008  4/1/2007  4/1/2008 
Korea  1/1/2008  1/1/2008 
Philippines  1/1/2007     Expected 2010  1/1/2007  Expected 2010 
Singapore  1/1/2008  1/1/2008 
Taiwan  1/1/2007  1/1/2008  1/1/2007  1/1/2008 
Thailand  12/31/2008  Expected 12/31/2009  Expected 
12/31/2009 
Sources: Regulatory agencies' websites; presentations and speeches by regulatory officials; press reports 
 
12/31/2008  lenges.  One of the most significant challenges is the use of a 
borrower’s credit rating to determine the appropriate risk 
weight for each credit.  For instance, a credit rated “AAA” 
receives a 20 percent risk weight, while a credit rated below 
investment grade will receive a much higher 150 percent risk 
weight.  This approach is aimed at addressing the “one-size-
fits-all” weakness of Basel I where all corporate claims 
(regardless of underlying credit quality) receive the same risk 
weight of 100 percent.  Arguably, this approach helps to strike 
a reasonable balance between risk sensitivity and complexity.  
However, it’s difficult to rely on external credit ratings in Asia 
for two key reasons. 
 
First, Asian regulators historically are skeptical of credit rat-
ing agencies; this stems from concern over the accuracy of 
agency ratings of banks during the 1997-1998 Asian financial 
crisis and of various assets during the more recent subprime 
crisis.  Therefore, some critics believe that the Standardized 
Approach, while an improvement over the broad brush ap-
proach under Basel I, is not a good solution to assigning accu-
rate risk weights.  Second, the percentage of Asian firms that 
receive ratings from the agencies is significantly lower than 
that in the G-10 countries.  The relatively limited availability 
of company ratings could undermine the purpose of imple-
menting the Standardized Approach because unrated corpo-
rate credits receive a 100 percent risk weight, the same as un-
der Basel I rules.  To date, China has expressed its intention 
not to implement this approach; one likely reason is the in-
complete coverage of Chinese companies by domestic credit 
rating agencies. 
 
While most Asian banks currently use the Standardized Ap-
proach for credit risk, some likely will adopt the Foundation 
or even the Advanced IRB approaches over the longer term 
due to the challenges associated with the Standardized Ap-
proach and the opportunity to enhance their internal risk man-
agement infrastructure to the level articulated by the more 
advanced approaches. 
 
On the operational risk side, almost all Asian economies are 
implementing the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standard-
ized Approach, which calculate operational risk charges based 
on a bank’s gross income.  These approaches are relatively 
simple and, therefore, do not appear to create significant im-
plementation issues.  However, as is the case with banks in 
other geographic regions, the inclusion of an operational risk 
charge likely will increase banks’ capital requirements. 
 
Implementation of the more advanced approaches 
Some Asian economies have started the process of adopting 
the Foundation or even the Advanced IRB Approaches for 
credit risk.  Following are the most significant implementation 
challenges that banks in those countries are facing:  
 
•  Enhancing internal management systems.  The adoption 
of the IRB Approach requires significant enhancements to 
banks’ existing risk management and measurement sys-
tems.  One simple example is the requirement to have an 
internal credit rating system that has two distinct dimen-
sions.  The first dimension must consider the risk of bor-
rower default and the other must take into account trans-
action-specific factors such as collateral, guarantees, and 
seniority or subordination of the obligation.  Many 
banks’ internal systems are not currently “two-
dimensional” and will have to be upgraded to meet IRB 
Approach requirements.  
 
•  Changing credit culture and governance.  Improving 
internal systems and meeting other qualifying IRB crite-
ria would require many banks to change their credit risk 
management culture because of the enhanced govern-
ance and internal control requirements associated with 
adopting the IRB Approach.  For instance, the so-called 
“use test” stipulates that banks should not use their inter-
nal ratings solely to qualify for IRB, but rather should 
incorporate their internal ratings information into other 
key processes such as the evaluation of loan pricing, 
credit approval, and the internal allocation of economic 
capital.  This is not currently a very common practice 
across Asian banks. 
 
•  Addressing data issues.  Banks are also encountering 
issues with data collection, integrity and accuracy.  Un-
der IRB, banks are required to collect and store historical 
data on borrower default, rating decisions, rating histo-
ries, and rating migration.  As some Asian banks did not 
begin this type of data collection process until recent 
years, their history of relevant default and loss data is not 
long enough to meet the requirements of the IRB Ap-
proach.  Furthermore, data collected is often not suffi-
cient to cover a full economic cycle, thereby exacerbat-
ing implementation issues.  Some analysts have sug-
gested that this problem is more acute in Asia, as cycles 
in Asian economies historically have been longer than 
those in more mature economies.  
 
•  Building expertise, both internally and externally.  As is 
the case for other geographical regions, banks also have 
to deal with resource and technical expertise implica-
tions in trying to implement the more complex ap-
proaches for credit risk.  In addition to attracting and 
retaining employees with the necessary skill sets for 
Basel II implementation, banks have to identify credible 
external parties to provide support and expertise to help 
develop their internal systems.  While outsourcing to 
external vendors provides some clear benefits, there are 
always risks associated with this approach. Because 
boards of directors and senior management are ulti-
mately responsible for the robustness of their internal 
systems, they must remain informed about relationships 
with external vendors and the related outsourced proc-
esses. 
 
On the operational risk side, most Asian economies have not 
formally adopted the AMA method.  Managing operational 
risk is a relatively new concept for many banks in the Asia 
region.  The AMA approach requires banks to review inter-nal and relevant external loss data, perform scenario analysis, 
and consider the business environment and internal control fac-
tors.  Similar to the more advanced credit risk approaches, the 
major challenges of implementing the advanced approach to 
operational risk include a lack of operational risk expertise and 
the collection of historical loss data.  In fact, even more mature 
economies, such as Hong Kong, are not requiring banks to im-
plement the AMA approach at this time.  Regulators in Hong 
Kong have said that they would like their banks to concentrate 
on IRB implementation in the near term.  While some econo-
mies, such as Taiwan and Singapore, permit the adoption of 
AMA, banks from those economies have not yet adopted the 
methodology.   
 
Regardless of the approaches used, Basel II implementation 
places significant demands on banks.  According to one con-
sulting firm, the costs are not restricted to direct expenditures 
on system and information technology enhancements, but also 




Challenges for Regulators 
Regulators also face challenges associated with the stringent 
qualifying requirements of the Basel II advanced approaches.  
Like banks, they have to address resource and technical exper-
tise implications, including recruiting staff with strong risk 
management and quantitative backgrounds, retaining qualified 
staff, identifying knowledge gaps, and providing necessary 
training to staff responsible for Basel II monitoring.  Even be-
fore the monitoring process begins, regulators have the compli-
cated task of reviewing and approving the formal adoption of 
the advanced credit and operational risk systems by their super-
vised banks. 
 
Due to the complex nature of the Basel II framework, there also 
is a strong need for increased cooperation and coordination be-
tween “home” and “host” country supervisors.  This is espe-
cially applicable to internationally active banks, including those 
with operations in Asia that are implementing the advanced 
approaches in cross-border locations.  Some major cross-border 
issues include the implementation of different approaches in 
different jurisdictions, differences in implementation timelines, 
information sharing between supervisors, and validation and 
approval of various models.  In this vein, the Basel Committee 
has issued guidance on defining a practical framework for 
cross-border implementation of Basel II.
v  The challenge facing 
financial sector regulators is finding an appropriate balance 
between accomplishing home and host supervisory needs while 
minimizing regulatory burden on banks. 
 
Conclusion 
With financial leaders and market participants advocating for 
more vigilant oversight of liquidity and capital, the Basel II 
standard likely will continue to evolve and its rules may experi-
ence more changes than originally envisioned.  Despite its 
shortcomings, the Basel II capital framework serves as an im-
portant mechanism for advancing financial sector reform and 
strengthening overall corporate governance.  Implementa-
tion will support the continuous enhancement of Asian fi-
nancial institutions’ risk monitoring programs and measure-
ment systems, which are key to the comprehensive manage-
ment of increasingly complex institutions. 
 
i. The Group of Ten (G-10) includes eleven industrial countries 
(Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States) which consult and cooperate on economic, monetary and 
financial matters.  The Ministers of Finance and Central Bank 
Governors of the G-10 usually meet once a year in connection 
with the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank.  
ii. The Market Risk Amendment was adopted by the Basel Com-
mittee in 1996, before Basel II was introduced.  As a result, while 
there are some proposed revisions to the amendment, this report 
does not discuss this risk category.  
iii. Basel II Challenges and Implications for Asia, Huaqing Wang, 
Assistant Chairman, China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
Speech presented on May 3, 2006 at the Asian Development Bank 
Annual Meeting. Available at: http://www.adb.org/
annualmeeting/2006/seminars/presentations/huaqing-wang-basel-
ii.pdf  
iv. Deloitte: Understanding the framework: adopting the Basel II 
Accord in Asia Pacific, 2005. 
v. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Home host informa-
tion sharing for effective Basel II implementation, June 2006; High 
level principles for the cross border implementation of new Ac-
cord, August 2003.  
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